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DEBUNKING THE DEATHBED ANALYSIS:
EXPLORING A NEW APPROACH TO ARTICLE 3
HEALTH CASES
Meredith Heim
ABSTRACT—This essay will explore Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it has been applied to deportation
cases of persons in poor health, with the ultimate goal of answering the
following question: Whether the deportation of a person to a place where she
or he will not receive adequate health care should constitute a violation of
ECHR Article 3. Further, this article will suggest how the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the national courts below them can better
review such cases in order to provide more meaningful protection to those
inflicted. In doing so, this essay specifically finds that (i) the ECtHR
incorrectly applied Article 3 to cases of poor health and deportation in the
past, (ii) the ECtHR still needs to further clarify an appropriate standard for
these cases, (iii) the national courts, particularly in the United Kingdom, are
incorrectly following old precedent, (iv) the ECtHR needs to explore all
claims presented to it in these cases, including claims of Article 2 and 8
violations, and (v) the ECtHR should shift more toward the American
Convention on Human Rights approach to Article 3 health cases in better
aligning with the European policies on the right to health. Ultimately, these
conclusions should assist in establishing sound justification for a relaxation
of the current standard used in Article 3 health cases in Europe today.
Note that this article was written as the Savran decision was being
handed down, so an in-depth analysis on Savran is absent. Savran was
decided in October 2019, after this article was started and shortly before the
article was finalized. Savran applied Paposhvili to mental health situations,
which is a significant development. In the section ‘Recommendations for
Future Research,’ this article calls for an examination of the role that mental
health plays in ECtHR decisions and how the court’s treatment of mental
health has changed over the years. Savran should help inform, and be a part
of, this future research.
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INTRODUCTION
Waterboarding, starvation, flogging – these are the obvious thoughts
that cross one’s mind when thinking of the Article 3 provision of the
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), which protects citizens
from undergoing any form of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.1 However, in 1997, the European Court on Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) expanded the traditional meaning2 of an Article 3 violation to
apply to deportation cases of seriously ill persons to places where they would
likely receive inadequate health care.3 That said, the meaning and application
of this expansion was effectively limited to only “very exceptional

1 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, art. 3 (Nov. 4, 1950),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html [hereinafter ECHR].
2 See, e.g., Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No. 24351/94, (April 24, 2003); Soering v. U.K., App. No.
14038/88, (July 7, 1989), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57619%22]}; Ireland
v. U. K., App. No. 5310/71, (Jan. 18, 1978), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%2200157506%22]}; see also, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Manual on Refugee Protection and the
ECHR Part 2.1 — Fact Sheet on Article 3 (Mar. 2003), https://www.unhcr.org/3ead2d262
[hereinafter ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet].
3 See
generally, D. v. U.K., App. No. 30240/96, ¶ 53 (May 2, 1997),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58035%22]}. This inadequacy in care
includes both a lack in necessary medical treatment and in personal support for their illness. Id.
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circumstances”,4 which courts consistently interpreted very narrowly and
eventually limited to only “deathbed” cases.5
Subsequently finding only one other violation of Article 3 in such cases
over a twenty-year period,6 the ECtHR essentially nullified the original
protections promulgated in its 1997 decision. Nevertheless, recent
developments in Article 3 health cases present uncertainty as to the true
application of Article 3,7 particularly in the United Kingdom.8 To briefly
explain, the ECtHR’s recent ruling in Paposhvili v. Belgium issued one of
the greatest changes to Article 3 health cases since the previously mentioned
1997 decision, D v. United Kingdom. In Paposhvili, the ECtHR Grand
Chamber broadened the types of health cases which trigger Article 3 from
the previously restricting standard requiring the applicant to be “terminally
ill or at an advanced stage of their illness” to cases where the absence of
appropriate treatment exposes the individual to a serious, rapid and
irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering

4

Id. at ¶ 54.
See Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10, ¶ 183 (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-169662%22]} (broadening Article 3 violations
to apply when the absence of appropriate treatment exposes the individual to a “serious, rapid and
irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction
in life expectancy.”);
N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05, (May
27, 2008),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-86490%22]}
(observing
the
courts
consistently narrow application since D. v. U.K.); GS (India) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2015]
EWCA (Civ) 40 (Eng.)
(limiting the application of Article 3 to health cases only when the deathbed test is applicable, with
deathbed referring to “terminally ill” or at an “advanced stage of their illness”); see also Julia Lowis,
Establishing a breach of Article 3 in medical cases: The ‘applicability’ of Strasbourg jurisprudence,
OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB, (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/establishing-a-breach-of-article-3-in-medical-cases-the-applicability-ofstrasbourg-jurisprudence/ (reiterating the “deathbed test” from N. v. SSHD in claiming the “exceptional”
Article 3 cases are only those where the individual is already terminally ill and still present in the territory
of the expelling state).
6 See
generally, B.B. v. France, App. No. 47/1998/950/1165, (Sept. 7, 1998),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58224%22]}.
7 Savran
v.
Denmark,
App.
No.
57467/15,
¶¶
35–54
(Oct.
1,
2019),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-196152%22]}; Paposhvili v. Belgium, App.
No. 41738/10 at ¶¶ 131–56; Aswat v. U.K., App. No. 17299/12, ¶¶ 50–62 (Apr. 16, 2013),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-118583%22]}; EA & Ors v. Sec’y of State for
the Home Dep’t [2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC); MM (Malawi) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2018]
EWCA (Civ) 1365 (Eng.); GS (India) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2015] EWCA (Civ) 40
(Eng.).
8 N. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1369 (Eng.); GS (India) v. Sec’y of
State for the Home Dep’t [2015] EWCA (Civ) 40 (Eng.) (significantly limited the application of Article
3 to cases involving an individual on their deathbed); EA & Ors v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t
[2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC).
5
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or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.9 In doing so, the court
officially denounced the deathbed analysis and instead set forth a more
comprehensive test for courts to apply moving forward.
Ultimately, the Paposhvili decision promulgated a more favorable
analysis for applicants of Article 3 health cases. Nevertheless, the United
Kingdom national courts subsequently refused to recognize the new
Paposhvili standard for Article 3 health cases and instead maintained the
“clear and constant line of decisions by ECtHR” using the deathbed analysis,
severely hindering the growth of Article 3 protections in such instances.10
Since then, courts, scholars, and citizens subject to the ECHR have struggled
to understand the interpretation and application of Article 3 to health cases.11
In sum, the severely limited and inconsistent approaches taken in such
instances leaves a protection gap in Article 3 health cases. Therefore, this
essay will examine the need for the ECtHR to resolve the complexity of
applying Article 3 protections to cases of deteriorated health and deportation.
Specifically, this article will (i) explore the development of Article 3 case
law and (ii) further analyze the Article 3 health case law, (iii) identify ECHR
Articles 2 and 8 as other potential legal implications for such health cases,
and (iv) compare ECHR Article 3 to Article 5 of the American Convention
on Human Rights (“ACHR”). In doing so, this essay will generally argue
that the ECtHR and national courts should recognize the Paposhvili case as
a step toward broadening the application of Article 3 to cases of deportation
in poor health. With that said, the ECtHR needs to set forth a more definitive
test for national courts to apply. Thus, this essay will also attempt to
introduce concepts that the ECtHR should consider in developing a new
standard in order to provide a firmer Article 3 protection beyond the
deathbed scenario.

9 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶¶ 180–84; see also Chloe Spaven, Article 3 Health
Cases – A new approach, WILSON SOLICITORS LLP (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.wilsonllp.co.uk/article3-health-cases-new-approach/.
10 EA & Ors v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC) (limiting the
application of Paposhvili in national courts since a current and conflicting standard already exists in UK
domestic law (i.e. N. v. U.K.)).
11 See, e.g., Chai Patel, Split human rights court suggests lower threshold for resisting removal on
medical grounds, FREE MOVEMENT, (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.freemovement.org.uk/split-humanrights-court-suggests-lower-threshold-for-resisting-removal-on-medical-grounds/; Alice Muzira, Article
3 Medical Condition Cases: The Paposhvili Test Returns to Plague the Court of Appeal, UK
IMMIGRATION
JUSTICE
WATCH
BLOG
(June
19,
2018),
https://ukimmigrationjusticewatch.com/2018/06/19/article-3-medical-condition-cases-the-paposhvilitest-returns-to-plague-the-court-of-appeal/ (claiming that national courts are currently stuck between two
applicable tests in medical condition cases).
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I.

BACKGROUND

This article will first explore the history and development of (i) Article
3 itself; (ii) Article 3 health law; (iii) other legal implications in Article 3
health cases, including ECHR Articles 2 and 8; and (iv) Article 5 of the
ACHR. Cultivating a better understanding of these individual topics
provides firmer standing for why these deportation cases belong under the
purview of ECHR Article 3 protections. The succeeding information will
then be used to advance the argument for why and how the current Article 3
health standard should be loosened.
A. The Development of ECHR Article 3
In practice, Article 3 of the ECHR affords two separate components to
its enforcement – (i) torture and (ii) inhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment.12 That said, the ECtHR requires the allegedly wrongful
treatment to meet an entry-level threshold based on the severity of the
suffering incurred.13 The measurement of this minimum depends on certain
circumstances of the case (e.g., duration of the treatment, physical or mental
effects, sex, age, and state of health of the victim).14 Once the entry level
threshold is met, though, the ECtHR has traditionally distinguished between
inhuman and degrading treatment and the much worse torture claims by
establishing another separate severity threshold.15 Essentially, torture
developed a much higher threshold, separate from the “minimum level of
severity” threshold to receive Article 3 standing, due to its “special stigma.”16
Everything not found to be torture is thus encompassed in inhuman and
degrading treatment.17
The distinction between these three acts has developed through ECtHR
case law over time, with torture always somehow alluding to an aggravated
form of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.18 At first, torture

12 ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 3; ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 1–5; ASS’N FOR THE
PREVENTION OF TORTURE, Guide to Jurisprudence on Torture and Ill Treatment, 13 (June 2002),
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/16023/Guide%20to%20Jurisprudence%20on%20Torture_E.pdf
[hereinafter APT Guide].
13 Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71 at ¶ 162 (references this minimum level of severity);
see also ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 3 (“[I]ll-treatment must attain a minimum level of
severity to fall within the scope of Article 3.”).
14 APT Guide, supra note 12, at 13 (noting this as being an “entry level threshold”).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 14 (“torture was often an ‘aggravated form of inhuman treatment’”) (internal citation
omitted).
17 Id. at 13.
18 Greek Case, Judgement of 18 November 1969, No. 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (1969) (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R.) (reading a purposive element into torture); see also Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No.
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was distinguished from the other two acts through a finding of purpose in the
act committed.19 However, Ireland v. U.K. adjusted this analysis ten years
later to instead base it upon a level of severity threshold. Not only did the
ECtHR in Ireland initially allude to the two individualized concepts of
Article 3 – “torture” and “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” –
but it also acknowledged the torture threshold to be “serious and cruel
suffering.”20 This case thus shifted the focus of the distinction between the
three elements of Article 3 from a finding of purpose in conducting the act
to the severity of its suffrage. This was also the first instance of tiering the
three acts based upon the progression of severity. 21 Eventually, the purpose
element was reintroduced in Selmouni v. France and remains implicitly
acknowledged in the ECtHR analysis today.22 Also, The Greek Case and
Ireland remain the two prominent cases in defining the three acts which
make up Article 3, with both indicating that the two most relevant features
of distinction are purpose for the act and severity of the suffering.
In 1989, exactly twenty years after the Greek Case, Soering v. United
Kingdom explored a different aspect of Article 3 analysis in evaluating
whether potential harm can constitute a breach of Article 3 in extradition and
expulsion cases.23 Here, extradition would not be allowed where “substantial
grounds” were shown that the person would face “a real risk” of being
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in the receiving

24351/94; APT Guide, supra note 12, at 13–14 (noting that the purposive element read into torture was
later refined in favor of a “threshold based on a sliding scale of severity between the three acts.”).
19 The Greek Case involved a review from the ECtHR on treatment from Greek security forces
following a military coup in 1967. Specifically, the Article 3 allegations included an administrative
practice of the government which led to a destruction of political participation and a breach in Article 3.
Id.
20 Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71 (the court recognized that the two threshold
determinations involved a similar subjective measuring of severity of pain and suffering occasioned by
the act.). The Ireland case concerned five methods of interrogation used by the UK troops on suspected
IRA members and found that the five techniques of sleep deprivation, stress positions, deprivation of food
and drink, subjection to noise and hooding to be in violation of Article 3, as inhuman treatment. Id.
(finding the five techniques did not rise to the high threshold necessary to constitute torture since there
was no physical bodily injury but there was at least intense physical and mental suffering and psychiatric
disturbances during interrogations.); see Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, (July 28, 1999),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58287%22]}; APT Guide, supra note 12, at
14.
21 APT Guide, supra note 12, at 14–15.
22 Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94; see also Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No. 24351/94 at ¶ 315;
APT Guide, supra note 12, at 16.
23 Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 at ¶ 23. This case concerned a German national
residing in the United Kingdom on a charge of murder in the United States and found that UK would be
in violation of Article 3 if it were to extradite the applicant due to the “real risk of being subject to inhuman
or degrading treatment” on death row upon extradition. Id.
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country.24 However, the case clarified that a mere possibility of ill treatment
in the receiving country would not give rise to a violation of Article 3.25
While the ECtHR is allowed to subjectively determine cases of potential
harm or risk, Saadi v. Italy concluded that the Court cannot undergo a
balancing test to extradite a person based on the level of harm he or she poses
to society.26
Overall, the general understanding coming out of these significant
Article 3 cases is that the ECtHR maintains its “degree of flexibility” by
purposefully refraining from the creation of an official list of acts which
classify as either torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.27 In doing so, the
Court regards the ECHR as “a living instrument which must be interpreted
in light of present-day conditions” and affords itself great flexibility when
applying it to Article 3 cases.28 These changes in perspective can be essential
in recognizing the extension of a right, as is seen in Article 3 health cases
where a real risk of substantial harm is presented by deportation.
B. The Absolute Nature of Article 3
Though the ECHR does not expressly maintain that the protections of
Article 3 are absolute, they are generally understood to be absolute rights in
nature,29 emerging from “human rights discourse” and ECtHR

24

Id. at ¶ 29; Cruz Varas & Others v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89, (Mar. 20, 1991),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57674%22]} (involving the potential expulsion
of two political asylum applicants and finding no violation merely because they did not establish strong
enough reasoning, or ‘substantial grounds’, to obtain refugee status). The Soering decision has also been
expanded to apply when the expulsion of a person has already occurred, indicating that the “level of risk”
be determined from the knowledge accrued at the time of the decision to deport. See Vilvarajah and Others
v.
U.K.,
App.
No.
13448/87,
(Oct.
30,
1991),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%2213448/87%22],%22itemid%22:[%2200157713%22]} (reaffirming Cruz Varas and setting specific criteria for assessing the risk of ill-treatment);
Chahal
v.
U.K.,
App.
No.
22414/93,
(Nov.
15,
1996),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58004%22]}; Saadi v. Italy, App. No.
37201/06, ¶¶ 124–27, (Feb. 28, 2008), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%2200185276%22]}.
25 Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 at ¶ 37; Vilvarajah and Others v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 13448/87 at ¶¶ 109–113.
26 Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 at ¶ 124–27.
27 APT Guide, supra note 12, at 15.
28 Id. at 13; see, e.g., Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94 at ¶ 101 (noting “the increasingly high
standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values
of democratic societies”).
29 Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 at ¶ 124–27; Michael K. Addo & Nicholas Grief, Does Article
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?, EUR. J. INT’L L., 510, 510–
524 (1998).
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jurisprudence.30 An absolute right is defined as being absent “permissible
limitations, exceptions or derogations,” and holds applicable regardless of
who the potential victim of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment is, what
she may have done, or where the treatment at issue would occur.31 Articles
32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees
present similar protections; however, the ECtHR itself has argued that ECHR
Article 3 Protections are “wider” than those set forth in said Convention.32
According to the UN Refugee Agency, this interpretation of Article 3 serves
as a “useful safety net” in international deportation law and reminds the
Court of its incredibly important role.33 For instance, in Vilvarajah v. United
Kingdom, the Court recognized that its examination into breaches of Article
3 “must necessarily be a rigorous one in view of the absolute character of
this provision and the fact that it enshrines one of the fundamental values of
the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.”34 This absolute
nature of the protections afforded by Article 3 can also play a significant role
in cases where the court appears to be taking inappropriate factors into
consideration of whether or not a breach of Article 3 is found. This
recognition might be essential in the analysis of Article 3 health cases.
C. Article 3 Health Law
The general Article 3 information outlined above may prove helpful on
its own for finding a clear Article 3 protection in cases of health and
deportation. This subsection, however, takes a more in-depth view of the
most relevant Article 3 health cases and the key concerns implicated by them
in order to help facilitate a better understanding of the essential elements and
issues of this jurisprudence. It is easiest to understand the Article 3 health
case law as creating three separate periods: (1) D. v. United Kingdom and the
“very exceptional circumstances” assessment,35 (2) N. v. United Kingdom

30 Id. at 512–13; see also Ireland v. U.K., App. No. 5310/71 at ¶ 163 (ECtHR formaly declaring “the
Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.”)
(emphasis added).
31 Addo & Grief, supra note 29, at 513; see also ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 15(2); ECHR Article 3
Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 4–8.
32 See Chahal v. U.K., App. No. 22414/93 at ¶¶ 79–83; see also Equality and Human Rights
Commission, Article 3: Freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-rights-act/article-3-freedom-torture-and-inhuman-ordegrading-treatment (noting that the absolute nature of Article 3 “means it must never be limited or
restricted in any way”).
33 ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 7.
34 Vilvarajah & Others v. U.K., App. No. 13448/87 at ¶¶ 105–08.
35 D. v. U.K. was decided in 1997 and this period lasted until N. v. U.K. was decided in 2008.
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and the “deathbed” analysis,36 and (3) Paposhvili v. Belgium and the formal
expansion of Article 3.37 This section thus analyzes these three periods
accordingly.
D. v. United Kingdom and the “very exceptional circumstances”
assessment
As briefly discussed earlier, D. v. United Kingdom was the first decision
to apply Article 3 protections to cases of deportation involving sickly
individuals who would receive inadequate health care upon arrival to the
receiving State. The applicant in this case suffered from HIV/AIDS when he
was threatened with expulsion from the United Kingdom to St. Kitts due to
his criminal convictions.38 The ECtHR found the removal would expose him
to the risk of dying under the “most distressing circumstances,” which
amounted to inhuman treatment under Article 3.39 The significance of this
case lies in the Courts’ pronouncement that this ruling was due to the “very
exceptional circumstances of [the] case and given the compelling
humanitarian considerations at stake.”40 This groundbreaking case set the
path for an abundance of similar Article 3 health cases, where the ECtHR
attempted to make sense of the “very exceptional circumstance” standard.41
Post-D. v. U.K. case law was quick to limit situations that were very
exceptional, though, as only one other case led to a violation of Article 3 in
the designated period.42
The one other case, B.B. v. France (1998), involved an applicant who
was suffering from the AIDS virus compounded by Kaposi’s syndrome and
1.

36 N. v. U.K. was decided in 2008 and this period technically lasted until 2016, when Paposhvili was
decided. However, national courts have refused to recognize Paposhvili, so it could be argued that N. v.
U.K. still rules.
37 Paposhvili was decided in 2016 and should arguably still be in effect today.
38 D. v. U.K., App. No. 30240/96 (finding three factors—(i) critical illness and being close to death,
(ii) no guaranteed access to medical care in the receiving State, and (iii) lack of availability of family care
or social support in the receiving State—as the “very exceptional circumstances” needed to meet the
Article 3 threshold).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 15.
41 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05; Ndangoya v. Sweden, App. No. 17868/03, 12–13, (June 22, 2004),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-24018%22]}; Amegnigan v. Netherlands, App.
No. 25629/04, 8–10, (Nov. 25, 2004), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%2200167675%22]}; Arcila Henao v. Netherlands, App. No. 13669/03, 7–9, (June 24, 2003),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-23281%22]}; Bensaid v. U.K., App. No.
44599/98, ¶¶ 303, 319, (Feb. 6, 2001), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%2200159206%22]}; S.C.C. v. Sweden, App. No. 46553/99, 6–8, (Feb. 15, 2000),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-5079%22]}; Karara v. Finland, App. No.
40900/98, (May 29, 1998), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-4301%22]}; B.B. v.
France, App. No. 47/1998/950/1165 at ¶¶ 37–39.
42 Id.
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presented signs of acute immunosuppression. The significance of this case,
according to subsequent courts, was that the applicant had reached an
“advanced stage” of his illness.43 The ECtHR found that the applicant’s
return to his native country of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where it
was likely he would lack access to treatment specifically designed to inhibit
the spread of the virus, would considerably increase the risk of infection.44
The Court, in ruling that his deportation would violate Article 3, therefore
found that the exposure of this applicant to a substantial risk to his health
was so serious as to amount to a violation of Article 3.45 Following this,
though, Article 3 health cases were all rejected, even under seemingly similar
circumstances.
2. N. v. United Kingdom and the “deathbed” analysis
D. v. U.K. was severely limited by the time N. v. United Kingdom
(hereinafter N. v. U.K.) came along, which only further narrowed its
interpretation. N. v. U.K. developed from the United Kingdom Upper
Tribunal’s ruling in N. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
(“SSHD”), which clarified that “very exceptional circumstances,” meant the
applicant was in the “last stage of his terminal illness”.46 Therefore, the “very
exceptional circumstances” standard should only apply in such cases of
either terminal illness or the advanced stage of an illness. The applicant in
this case also suffered from chronic AIDS with “considerable
immunosuppression and . . . disseminated mycobacterium TB” but she was
not considered critically ill and thus no violation of Article could be found
upon her deportation to Uganda.47 On appeal, the ECtHR Grand Chamber in
N. v. U.K. affirmed the Upper Tribunal’s decision that this particular case
did not constitute a breach of Article 3.48 While the ECtHR alluded to the
possibility that there could be “very exceptional circumstances” other than
deathbed cases,49 it did not set forth a definitive standard for subsequent

43

B.B. v. France, App. No. 47/1998/950/1165 at ¶¶ 19–23.
Id. at 12.
45 Id.
46 N. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1369 [16], (Eng.) (“The fact that an
applicant’s life expectancy will be reduced, even substantially reduced, because the facilities in the
receiving country do not match those in the expelling country is not sufficient to engage Article 3.
Something more is required. I have already referred to the special circumstances which enabled the court
in D to find that Article 3 was engaged. I do not say that Article 3 will only ever be engaged where the
applicant is in the last stages of a terminal illness. But I consider that the class of case recognised in D. as
engaging Article 3.”).
47 Id. at 3.
48 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05.
49 Id. . Specifically, where the “humanitarian considerations are equally compelling.”; Id.
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courts to apply and instead recommended each case be determined on a caseby-case basis.
Thus, the affirmation of the N. v. SSHD decision instead allowed for
national courts to officially restrict Article 3 health cases to the deathbed
analysis.50 This situation was later found in GS (India) v. SSHD.51 Therefore,
the issues of the N. v. U.K. period more so involve the misapplication by
ECHR signatory states of ECtHR standards to cases following the 2008
decision rather than the error in judgment on behalf of the ECtHR. That is
not to say that the ECtHR did nothing wrong, though. It should have found
a violation of Article 3 in N. v. U.K. based on “compelling humanitarian
considerations” or, at the very least, provided distinct factors of “very
exceptional circumstances” for future courts to apply rather than the vague
statement that it did.52 In fact, the dissent in N. v. U.K. expresses a reasoned
analysis more aligned with Paposhvili in recognizing that the Court is on the
wrong side of the argument.53
3. Paposhvili v. Belgium and the Formal Expansion of Article 3
On its face, Paposhvili v. Belgium might not appear to affect much
change from the principles referenced in N. v. U.K. However, the standard it
produced can be thought to “clarify or qualify” the N. v. U.K. standard to
some degree, and relax the language for which circumstances are “very
compelling”.54 Paposhvili involved an applicant suffering from chronic
lymphocytic leukemia and tuberculosis. The ECtHR found it would be a
violation of Article 3 to deport Paposhvili to Georgia, declaring his condition
as life-threatening, based on considerably detailed evidence provided by
Paposhvili of his specialized treatment.55 Coming out of this case, the Court

See generally, Aswat v. U.K., App. No. 17299/12 at ¶¶ 50–52; GS (India) & Ors v. Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t [2015] EWCA (Civ) 40 [66] (Eng.); Tatar v. Switzerland, App. No. 65692/12, ¶ 50
(July 14, 2015), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-153770%22]}.
51 GS (India) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2015] EWCA (Civ) 40 (Eng.) (This case involved
six applicants, five of which were suffering from terminal renal failure or end stage kidney disease
(ESKD) and the sixth was at an advanced stage of HIV infection. The court here decided that these
applicants could not fall within the D exception because their conditions could not be “alleviated by
recourse to Article 3”, no matter how grave they may be.); Id. (After further analysis of the application
of D. v. U.K., the court here found “[the D. v. U.K.] citations demonstrate that in the view of the House
of Lords the D exception is confined to deathbed cases.”).
52 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 (applying Article 3 to cases where the individual is “critically ill”
and “close to death,” thereby indirectly affirming the deathbed application).
53 Id. at 251–62 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
54 AM (Zimbabwe) & Anor v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2018] EWCA (Civ) 64, [30]
(Eng.); Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 194 (changing, for instance, N. v. U.K.’s “critically
ill” and “close to death” Article 3 qualifications to “very serious”, “chronic illness” that is “lifethreatening.”).
55 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 206 .
50
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provided guidance on the burden of proof necessary for the expelling State
to comply with Article 3, focusing on the foreseeable consequences of
removal.56 Specifically, the court listed three verifications for the returning
State to make prior to a person’s deportation: (i) to verify whether the
available care is sufficient and appropriate in practice for the treatment of the
applicant’s illness so as to prevent him or her being exposed to treatment
contrary to Article 3; (ii) to consider the extent to which the individual in
question will actually have access to this care and these facilities in the
receiving State; and (iii) to consider the cost of medication and treatment,
the existence of a social and family network, and the distance to be travelled
in order to have access to the required care.57 The Court also added that if
there remain “serious doubts” regarding the impact of removal following the
States’ assessment, then the returning State “must obtain individual and
sufficient assurance from the receiving State that appropriate treatment will
be available and accessible on return.”58 Ultimately, the ECtHR shifted a
significant amount of the pleading burden onto the expelling state and
presented a more lenient standard for the protection of sick individuals facing
deportation. Nevertheless, national courts have either refused to apply the
Paposhvili standard or have arguably applied it incorrectly.59
For instance, EA &. Ors specifically rejected Paposhvili in favor of the
clear and constant N. v. U.K. standard applied in the United Kingdom.60
Tensions between these standards increased even more in the United
Kingdom when the national court was presented with cases like AM
(Zimbabwe) v. SSHD and MM (Malawi) v. SSHD. In particular, AM
(Zimbabwe) confirmed that Paposhvili “relax[ed] the test for violation of
Article 3 in the case of removal of a foreign national with a medical
condition,” moving past the previously accepted deathbed analysis.61 But, it

56

Id. at ¶¶ 170, 187.
Id. at ¶¶ 189-91.
58 Id. at ¶ 191.
59 Savran v. Denmark, App. No. 57467/15; Aswat v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17299/12; EA &
Ors v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC); MM (Malawi) v. Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1365 (Eng.); GS (India) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t
[2015] EWCA (Civ) 40 (Eng.); N. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1369 (Eng.).
60 EA & Ors v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2017] UKUT 00445 (IAC).This case concerned
three applicants suffering from schizoaffective disorder, HIV/AIDS, and ankylosing spondylitis. All were
receiving treatment in the United Kingdom but were not yet at a critical stage in their illness. The Upper
Tribunal found that it was not bound to follow the Paposhvili test because it departed from a “clear and
constant line of authority” including N. v U.K. and was not consistent with domestic law of the United
Kingdom. Instead of applying this “contrary . . . judicial precedent”, the court followed N. v. U.K. and
GS (India), which applied N. v. U.K., in finding the D. v. U.K. exception “confined to deathbed cases.”
Id. at [29].
61 AM (Zimbabwe) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2018] EWCA (Civ) 64, [37] (Eng.).
57
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“did so only to a very modest extent.”62 MM (Malawi), however, complicated
the situation by presenting a convoluted approach to Article 3 health cases
in holding that an applicant might meet the Paposhvili test even if they do
not meet the N. v. U.K. standard.63 It further confused the situation by
applying the binding N. v. U.K. criteria but also appearing to equate the actual
test used with that of the Paposhvili factors.64 Ironically, the ECtHR during
this time made clear that Paposhvili was the “formally binding guidance on
the removal of seriously ill people” and that it should be applied when
considering removal.65
Very recently, the ECtHR split in its decision to validate Paposhvili in
Savran v. Denmark, which dealt with the aspect of “sufficient assurance”
from the Paposhvili test.66 In officially affirming the Paposhvili test over N.
v. U.K., the ECtHR found that the expelling State had not adequately
mitigated the uncertainties raising serious doubts as to the impact of
removing the applicant.67 Even given the direct language of this analysis,
critics today argue that this case was not the correct one to affirm Paposhvili
and the ECtHR rushed into this decision in an attempt to tie the hands of
ECtHR signatory states regarding Article 3 health cases.68 However, the true
effect of this case is yet to be determined, as it was only decided in January
2019. Until then, these cases ultimately represent a potential failure of the
ECtHR and national courts to protect sickly individuals from inhumane and
degrading treatment following their deportation. Two major issues cause
this: (1) ECtHR has not provided an effective standard for the national courts
62

Id.
MM (Malawi) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2018] EWCA (Civ) 1365, [¶ 10] (Eng.)
(involving applicants who were suffering from HIV infection and primary mediastinal large-B cell
lymphoma. Despite there being no violation of Article 3 found, the Court did recognize that applicants
can meet either N. v. U.K. or Paposhvili); see also Muzira, supra note 11.
64 Id.
65 Khaksar
v.
U.K.,
App.
No.
2654/18,
¶
32
(Apr.
3,
2018),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-182755%22]}. The applicant in this case was
a victim of bombing in Afghanistan and suffered from medical conditions following the blasts. He was
threatened with deportation back to Afghanistan and was not considered to be in a critical stage of an
illness. While the court could not apply the Paposhvili standard because the applicant had not exhausted
all national remedies available to him, the Court did affirm the standing of Paposhvili in such
circumstances. Id.
66 Savran v. Denmark, App. No. 57467/15 at ¶ 22. This case concerned a paranoid schizophrenic
applicant whom was being deported to Turkey on account of his criminal convictions. The court
recognized the burden shift from Paposhvili in finding that the expelling State needed to mitigate any
doubts of treatment contrary to Article 3 upon deportation. Id.
67 Id.
68 Mark Klaassen, A new chapter on the deportation of ill persons and Article 3 ECHR: the European
Court of Human Rights judgment in Savran v. Denmark, STRAUSBOURG OBSERVERS (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/10/17/a-new-chapter-on-the-deportation-of-ill-persons-andarticle-3-echr-the-european-court-of-human-rights-judgment-in-savran-v-denmark/.
63
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to follow in applying Article 3 as Papshvili did and (2) the national courts
are improperly applying the principles and standards which are provided by
the ECtHR. Given this, it follows that the ECtHR and national courts need
to resolve the complexity involved in applying Article 3 to deportation cases
of individuals in poor health.
D. Other Legal Implications: ECHR Articles 2 and 8
Aside from the implication of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment, these Article 3 health cases present corresponding issues for an
individual’s rights to life, privacy, and family life. In fact, “[h]ealth-related
cases brought before the [ECtHR] have most frequently been argued under
Articles 2, 3, [and] 8 . . . of the Convention.”69 Still, the ECtHR regularly
dismisses any adjoining Article 2 or 8 claims when they are advanced in such
Article 3 health cases.70 Therefore, this section will explore Articles 2 (right
to life) and 8 (right to privacy and family life) of the ECHR and their
corresponding case law in order to develop the argument that these articles
can greatly enhance the finding of an ECHR violation, especially when
Article 3 alone proves insufficient . In general, this section will help develop
the idea that the ECtHR should review all claims pleaded in such Article 3
health cases to provide the full protections postulated by the Convention.
This is especially relevant when Article 3 fails.71
1. Article 2 and the Right to Life
Article 2 of the ECHR protects “[e]veryone’s right to life” and specifies
that “[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention
of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than
absolutely necessary.”72 Similar to Article 3, Article 2 is said to
fundamentally tie to the absolute protections provided by Article 15 of the
ECHR, meaningthere must be no derogation from its protections.73 In
practice, the Court has interpreted Article 2 to include two substantive
obligations of the State: (1) the general obligation to protect the right to life

69 Thematic Report, Health-related issues in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights,
1, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015) [hereinafter Thematic Report].
70 See, e.g., N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 16.
71 See Id. at 20–31 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
72 ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 2; ECtHR, Guide on Article 2 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, (updated 2020), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_2_ENG.pdf [hereinafter
ECtHR Article 2 Guide] at 6 (listing “(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order
to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; [and] (c) in action lawfully
taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection” as examples of absolutely necessary situations).
73 ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69.
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and (2) the prohibition of intentional deprivation of life.74 The effect of this
was the complete abolition of death penalty sentences in Protocol 13 to the
Convention.75
As expected, there are many Article 2 cases which help to inform issues
presented in Article 3 health cases. For instance, McCann and Others v.
United Kingdom provides that “the object and purpose of the Convention as
an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its
provisions must be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards
practical and effective.”76 It also creates an “absolutely necessary” threshold
for Article 2 cases involving intentional acts to require proof that a violation
has occurred beyond that which was absolutely necessary.77 Taken together
with the ECtHR ruling in Oyal v. Turkey, where the court found allegations
of persons suffering from serious illnesses to fall under Article 2 of the
Convention when the circumstances potentially engaged the responsibility
of the State, ECtHR case law indicates that both intentional acts or decisions
of the State in question as well as omission of necessary acts of the State
implicate Article 2, as related to health cases.78 Finally, the ECtHR in R.R.
and Others v. Hungary examined allegations of Article 2 violations

74 Id.; see also Boso v. Italy (Reports of Judgements and Decisions), App. No. 50490/99, ¶¶ 458–60
(May 9, 2002), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-23338%22]} (providing a list of
exceptions).
75 ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 15; Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstance,
opened for signature Mar. 5, 2002, ETS No. 187 (2002) [hereinafter Protocol 13]; ECtHR, Guide on
Article
15
of
the
European
Convention
on
Human
Rights,
(2020),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_15_ENG.pdf [hereinafter ECtHR Article 15 Guide].
76 McCann
& Others v. U.K., App. No.18984/91, ¶ 146 (Sept. 27, 1995),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57943%22]} (emphasis added); see also
Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 at ¶ 27.
77
Id.
78 Oyal
v.
Turkey,
App.
No.4864/05
at
¶
76,
(June
6,
2010),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-97848%22]} (unanimously finding a violation
of Article 2 due to the States’ failure to train, supervise and inspect the work of the medical staff involved
in blood transfusions, which led to his HIV infection, and emphasizing the need to do so for “more general
considerations” of public health and safety and the prevention of similar errors.); see also L.C.B. v. U.K.,
App. No. 23413/94, (Nov. 26, 1996), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%2200145780%22]} (concerning an applicant suffering from leukaemia); G.N. & Others v. Italy, App. No.
43134/05, (Jan. 03, 2010), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-95926%22]}
(concerning applicants suffering from a potentially life-threatening disease of hepatitis); Hristozov &
Others
v.
Bulgaria,
App.
No.
47039/11,
(Apr.
29,
2013),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-114492%22]} (concerning applicants suffering
from different forms of terminal cancer).
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involving potential risks to an individual’s life that had not yet materialized
and found that there had been a serious threat to their lives.79
Following this, it is understandable why Article 3 health cases regularly
include Article 2 violation claims.80 However, the Court often opts to dismiss
the Article 2 analysis once they have made a ruling on the Article 3
violation.81 In doing so, the ECtHR reasons that the substance of Article 2
and Article 3 complaints are “indissociable . . . in respect of the
consequences of the impugned decision for [the applicant’s] life, health and
welfare.”82 Interestingly enough, the ECtHR’s own guidelines include a
procedural obligation “to carry out an effective investigation into alleged
breaches of its substantive limb” due to its fundamental character.83
However, the case law is lacking on such investigation in Article 3 health
cases.
2. Article 8 and the Right to Privacy and Family Life
Article 8 of the ECtHR proclaims, “everyone has the right to his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence” and “[t]here shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right . . . .”84
Section 1 of Article 8 signifies four individual categories for invoking the
article in a complaint – private life, family life, home, and correspondence.85
Much like Article 3, the ECtHR has broadly defined the scope of Article 8,
79 R.R.
&
Others
v.
Hungary,
App.
No.
36037/17,
(Mar.
2,
2021),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-208406%22]} (involving applicants who were
denied access to the Witness Protection Program).
80 D. v U.K., App. No. 30240/96 at ¶¶ 55–59 (claim was brought but the Court determined it
unnecessary to go through the analysis); ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69, at 18 (“Article 2 of the
[ECHR] prohibits the extradition or deportation of an individual to another State where substantial
grounds have been shown for believing that he or she would face a real risk of being subjected to the
death penalty there.”). ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69, at 19 (While Article 2 prohibits deportation
in the face of a real risk to the individual’s life, it focuses on the applicant facing some form of death
penalty or social crucifixion upon his return rather than physical or mental health).
81 D. v U.K., App. No. 30240/96 at ¶ 58 (“Commission did not find it necessary to decide whether
the risk to the applicant’s life expectancy created by his removal disclosed a breach of Article 2 (art. 2).
It considered that it would be more appropriate to deal globally with this allegation when examining his
related complaints under Article 3”).
82 Id.
83 See Armani Da Silva v. U.K., App. No. 5878/08, ¶ 229 (Mar. 30, 2016),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22Armani%20Da%20Silva%20v.%20United%20Ki
ngdom%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22JUDGMENTS%22,%22DECISIONS%22],%22item
id%22:[%22001-161975%22]} .
84 ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 8 (also providing exceptions to section 2: “except such as in accordance
with the law and is necessary in domestic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
85 ECtHR Guide, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf [hereinafter ECtHR Article 8 Guide] at ¶ 1 .
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rather than subjecting it to an exhaustive definition or list of acts.86 However,
the scope has been limited by a severity test in some circumstances.87 “Acts
or measures of a private individual which adversely affect the physical or
psychological integrity of another,” 88 have been included in such
circumstances because the ECtHR articulates Article 8 to particularly
guarantee “a person’s right to physical and psychological integrity.”89
Additionally, Article 8 provides a right to personal development, and the
right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the
outside world.90 While not all relationships “fall within the scope of private
life,”91 parental and marital statuses have been recognized as falling within
the ambit of private and family life.92 Finally, unlike the absolute rights found
in Articles 2 and 3, the analysis of Article 8 involves a weighing of
competing interests to find a “fair balance” between the protections of an
individual and society.93
X and Y v. Netherlands was the first indication by the ECtHR that
Article 8 covered the physical and moral integrity of a person.94 Moreover,
86 Bensaid v. U.K., App. No. 44599/98 at ¶¶ 46–47; see also ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82,
at ¶¶ 2-3.
87 Nicolae Virgiliu Tânase v. Romania, App. No. 41720/13, ¶ 128 (June 25, 2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194307 ; see also Denisov v. Ukraine, App. No. 76639/11, ¶ 116
(Sept. 25, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-191971 (“If the consequence-based approach was
at stake, the threshold of severity with respect to those typical aspects of private life assumed crucial
importance. It was for the applicant to show convincingly that the threshold had been attained. The
applicant had to present evidence substantiating consequences of the impugned measure. The Court
would only accept that Article 8 was applicable where those consequences were very serious and had
affected his or her private life to a very significant degree. An applicant’s suffering was to be assessed by
comparing his or her life before and after the measure in question. In determining the seriousness of the
consequences in employment-related cases it was appropriate to assess the subjective perceptions claimed
by the applicant against the background of the objective circumstances existing in the particular case.
That analysis would have to cover both the material and the non-material impact of the alleged measure.
However, it remained for the applicant to define and substantiate the nature and extent of his or her
suffering, which had to have had a causal connection with the impugned measure.”).
88 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶ 67; Nicolae Virgiliu Tânase v. Romania, App. No.
41720/13 at ¶ 126 (“The concept of ‘private life’ is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition.).
89 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 26 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
90 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶68; See generally Pretty v. U.K., App. No. 2346/02, ¶
61 (April 29, 2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60448.
91 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶ 69.
92 Id. at ¶ 274.
93 Id. at ¶ 140.
94 X.
and Y. v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, ¶ 22 (Mar. 26, 1985),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57603 (This case concerned the sexual assault of a mentally disabled
sixteen-year old girl and the absence of legal protection available to her. Following this, the Court has
held that “the authorities’ positive obligations – in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention
and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 (ibid.) – may include
a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of
violence by private individuals,”); ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶ 79.
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Article 8 has been invoked in “very exceptional circumstances,” specifically
when the expelling State either knowingly acted or failed to act on behalf of
a person whose life was threatened due to their lack of access to necessary,
life-saving treatment.95 It reasonably follows that Article 3 health cases also
frequently involve claims of Article 8 violations, as they often involve a
review of the applicant’s ties and support system. However, prior to N. v.
U.K., the practice of the ECtHR was to recurrently halt analysis on the
Article 8 claim after it either accepted or rejected the Article 3 claim, similar
to their Article 2 procedure.96 The dissent in N. v. U.K. challenged this
procedure based on the understanding of Article 8 outlined directly above,
stating that when the Court faces “the situation of a person who will, without
doubt, be sent to certain death . . . it could neither legally nor morally confine
itself to [conclude] ‘[no] separate question arises under Article 8 of the
Convention’.”97 The one prominent ECtHR case prior to N. v. U.K., which at
least reviewed the Article 8 claim, even after dismissing the Article 3 claim,
is Bensaid v. United Kingdom.98 This case involved an applicant suffering
from a long-term mental illness – schizophrenia – in which the Court found
the “real risk” of the removal insufficient to meet Article 3 standards.99
Rather than stop the inquiry there, however, the Court rightfully assessed the
Article 8 claim separately, clarifying that “[m]ental health must also be
regarded as a crucial part of private life associated with the aspect of moral
integrity.”100 Nevertheless, the Court found no violation of Article 8, as
removal of the applicant would comply with the “accordance of the law”

95 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶ 117; see also Mehmet Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey,
App. No. 54969/09, ¶ 84 (June 25, 2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194325 (the court further
found “where a patient did not have access to such treatment because of “systemic or structural
dysfunction in hospital services, and where the authorities knew or ought to have known of this risk and
did not take the necessary measures to prevent it from being realized.”) (citing Lopes de Sousa Fernandes
v. Portugal).
96 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶¶ 26, 30 (Tulkens, J., dissenting). The later Court called this
practice into question. (“Whilst it is understandable that the Court . . . has refrained from examining a
second complaint – concerning the same facts – when the first has given rise to a finding of a violation,
it is certainly strange for the Court to . . . [do so] after finding there was no violation of Article 3 of the
Convention”, merely proclaiming that “it is not necessary.”).
97 Id. at ¶ 26 (internal citations omitted).
98 Bensaid v. U.K., App. No. 44599/98 at ¶¶ 46–49.
99 Id. at ¶ 40 (noting the “high threshold set by Article 3” and explaining that the applicant’s situation
would merely be “less favourable” in Algeria and there is still risk for relapse or deterioration in the
United Kingdom).
100 Id. at ¶ 46 (specifying that “the Court’s case-law does not exclude that treatment which does not
reach the severity of Article 3 treatment may nonetheless breach Article 8 in its private life aspect where
there are sufficiently adverse effects on physical and moral integrity.”). Other important elements of the
personal sphere protected by Article 8 include gender identification, name and sexual orientation and
sexual life. See ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 148-149.
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feature of Article 8, Section 2.101 Regardless of the outcome in this case, it
can be said that Article 8 plays a prominent role in at least the Article 3 heath
cases involving mental illness.
E. Comparative Analysis: Article 5 and the ACHR
Much can be inferred from the differences between the two torture
provisions of the ECHR and the American Convention on Human Rights
(“ACHR”). On the face of the two instruments, the ACHR appears to provide
greater rights and protections than the ECHR.102 However, as we have seen
through the ECtHR’s interpretation of a purposive element in the Article 3
analysis of torture, the ECtHR has begun converging with the American
provisions and standards through practice.103 This suggests that a
comparative analysis of the ACHR and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (“IACtHR”) jurisprudence can provide valuable information and
spark guidelines for how the European judicial system can clean up the
messy Article 3 health case law.
The initial distinction between these two documents lies in the torture
provision titles themselves. With the ECHR Article 3 provision entitled
“Prohibition of Torture” and the ACHR Article 5 provision designated
“Right to Humane Treatment,” these articles seem to present both negative
and positive rights on their collective states, respectively. To explain, Article
3 of the ECHR focuses on things its member states cannot do, while Article
5 of the ACHR highlights the rights available to member states in its title.
This distinction can play a significant role in arguing that the American
system has a more lenient Article 5 protection; however, this cannot be
determined without first looking to the actual text of the provisions.
101 Bensaid v. U.K., App. No. 44599/98 at ¶ 48; see also ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at
¶ 1 (explaining that section 2 of Article 8 provides that there shall be no interference by a public authority
with one’s Article 8 rights and furthering that “[i]n order to invoke Article 8, an applicant must show his
or her complaint falls within one of the four interests listed above. Upon such a showing, the Court then
examines the extent of interference on the individual’s life. That said, there are exceptions which allow
certain interferences by the State, which include national security, public safety, or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Ultimately, limitations are permitted so long as they
are in “accordance with the law” and are “necessary in a democratic society” for the protection of one of
the objectives set out above. The necessity then requires a balancing test between the conflicting
interests.”).
102 For instance, the text of the ACHR’s Article 5 more expansively defines humane treatment and
creates a positive right to it versus the negative right against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment
presented in ECHR Article 3. American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” art.
5, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at: https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf[hereinafter ACHR].
103 See Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94 at ¶¶ 97–98; see also Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No.
24351/94 at ¶ 313; APT Guide, supra note 12, at 16.
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Vast differences separately exist in the actual language of these torture
provisions. As previously articulated, Article 3 of the ECHR is short and
simple: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”104 The ACHR, on the other hand, presents a much
more in-depth vision for Article 5 protections, with 6 separate provisions
referring to its guaranteed rights:
“1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral
integrity respected. 2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of
their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person. 3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than
the criminal. 4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances,
be segregated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate
treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons. 5. Minors
while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from adults and
brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they
may be treated in accordance with their status as minors. 6. Punishments
consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform
and social readaptation of the prisoners.”105

Such an explicitly designed provision suggests that the founders of the
ACHR and Article 5, in particular, desired a more protective right against
acts of torture than the ECHR provided. In fact, it is clear that Article 5 goes
far beyond protections against torture under the ECHR, as the language of
Article 3 is merely one of the six provisions.106
Similar to the ECtHR’s development of its Article 3 analysis, the
IACtHR created (i) a threshold which must be passed before finding a
violation of Article 5, (ii) distinctions between differing levels of violations,
(iii) as well as many other issues relating to how far the Court is willing to
go in interpreting the broadly written article. However, Caesar v. Trinidad
and Tobago presents the comparative case from the IACtHR in Article 3
violations.107 In this case, the applicant was sentenced to serve 20 years in a
penitentiary with hard labor and to receive 15 strokes of the cat-o-nine tails.
He had to be spread eagle for the flogging, and the punishment was carried
out despite his [deteriorated] physical condition. Six people were present for
the punishment. He screamed out in pain and eventually fainted. The
104

ECHR, supra note 1, art. 3.
ACHR, supra note 99, art. 5.
106 ACHR, supra note 99, art. 5(2).
107 Trinidad
and
Tobago,
Inter-Am.
Ct.
https://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_123_ing.pdf.
105

H.R.(Mar.
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IACtHR consequently found corporal punishment in the form of flogging as
a form of torture.
Despite its scarcer jurisprudence, the IACtHR has indeed reviewed an
Article 3 health case under the ACHR – Andrea Mortlock v. The United
States. In this case, the applicant was a Jamaican national living in the United
States where she contracted HIV/AIDS and required aggressive treatment
and care.108 The applicant faced deportation due to her criminal convictions
on drug offenses.109 Upon review, the IACtHR found that the applicant’s
deportation would violate Article 5, as it would “amount to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment” when combined with the lack of psycho-social
support for her care.110 What’s more, the deportation in this case would have
been deemed punishment against the applicant since it was directly linked to
her criminal convictions.111 The ACtHR’s finding that the applicant’s
deportation “may well be fatal” despite the risk of death not being imminent
affords protections to citizens of ACHR member states that have yet to firmly
develop under the mirroring ECHR torture provision.112 This shows that the
European justice system stands well below the American’s more lenient
application of Article 5, at least in respect to the protections afforded to sick
individuals facing deportation to countries with inadequate health care. In
fact, the ECtHR referenced this itself, in S.J. v. Belgium, when the dissent
celebrated the ACtHR’s finding in Andrea and embraced the rejection of N.
v. U.K. for a more liberal standard.113
II. ANALYSIS
This section focuses on answering the broad question of whether the
deportation of a person to a place where she or he will not receive adequate
health care should constitute a violation of ECHR Article 3. In doing so, it
addresses the two following sub-questions: First, is it an Article 3 violation
to deport someone to a country with inadequate health care under the ECHR
and at what point should the deportation constitute an Article 3 violation
under the ECHR? Second, how can the ECtHR and national courts better
review such cases in order to provide more meaningful protections to those
Andrea Mortlock v. The United States, Case 12.534, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 63/08,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 16 (2009).
109
Id. at ¶ 20.
110 Id. at ¶ 90 (finding that her state of health was presently stable but that her deportation would
nevertheless result in a premature death due to a “revival of the symptoms” given the lack of treatment
available.).
111 Id. at ¶ 24.
112 Id. at ¶ 90.
113 S.J. v. Belgium, App. No. 70055/10, ¶ 1 (Mar. 19, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001153361 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., dissenting).
108
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inflicted? Both questions require an in-depth review of the background
information provided above to determine which approach is the correct to
take in Article 3 health cases. The second question requires identifying
concepts that the ECtHR should consider in promulgating a more definitive
standard for determining whether the deportation of a sick individual to a
State with inadequate health care violates Article 3. For the purpose of
clarity, this section will be organized similarly to the background subsections above: (i) Article 3 today and its application in health cases; (ii)
other legal implications in Article 3 health cases, including ECHR Articles
2 and 8; and (iii) Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
A. Article 3 Today and its Application in Health Cases
In considering the background information on Article 3 and its
application in health cases from above, it follows that the ECtHR has been
incorrectly applying Article 3 to deportation cases involving sick applicants
and is still in a state of confusion e following Paposhvili’s more lenient
application of a slightly relaxed standard. Additionally, the national courts
are improperly refusing to apply Paposhvili over the long-established legal
analysis from N. v. U.K. Given this, the ECtHR needs to go further than it
did in Paposhvili in clarifying an appropriate and irrefutable standard to use
in such Article 3 health cases.
The ECtHR incorrectly applied Article 3 to these particular cases of
deportation, as it demoted the absolute nature of the Article’s protections by
approaching each of these cases in such a way that essentially no protection
could be afforded. It is true that Article 3 is known to contain a high entrylevel threshold for the severity of suffering incurred; however, it is also true
that this Court has afforded Article 3 protections in analogous situations
outside of the health and deportation context. For instance, in Saadi and
Soering, the challenged State did not directly inflict harm onto the applicants
and the applicants regularly conducted crimes which make their deportation
personally justified.114 However, the ECtHR has strictly forbidden the
consideration of such arguments in Article 3 analyses, in favor of a broader
approach to the absolute right, holding that potential harm is sufficient to
find an Article 3 violation and the wrongdoings of an applicant are
irrelevant.115 Yet, the mere fact that no cases have reached the potential harm
threat to Article 3 alone suggests that the Court is improperly weighing the
facts of these cases. It is no coincidence that the more tenuous the link
between the alleged ill-treatment and the conduct of State authorities, the
114 See Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 at ¶¶ 120–122 ; Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No.
14038/88 at ¶ 12.
115 Id.
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higher the threshold of risk assessment applied by the Court for the purposes
of establishing the responsibility of the returning State under Article 3.116
This argument is furthered by the fact that the ECtHR has continually
taken other improper considerations into account during their Article 3
analysis. N. v. U.K. itself serves as one of many examples of this, as the
Majority in this case factored into its decision the burden on the health care
systems of expelling states in Article 3 health cases.117 Evidently, the ECtHR
is incorrectly conducting more of an Article 8 balancing test rather than
appropriately awarding the absolute rights promulgated in Article 3.118 A
more suitable analysis of Article 3 as an absolute right, however, should not
consider the cost or burden to the Expelling State. In nevertheless doing so,
the Dissent acknowledged that the Majority was relying on a principle to
Article 3 case law that had since been overturned.119 The Majority referenced
Soering’s finding that “inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search
for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s
fundamental rights [ . . . ].”120 However, this balancing of States’ economic
interests against an individual’s rights was overruled in Saadi v. Italy.121 The

116 Andrea Saccucci, The protections from removal to unsafe countries under the ECHR: not all that
glitters is gold, QIL (July 14, 2014),http://www.qil-qdi.org/the-protection-from-removal-to-unsafecountries-under-the-echr-not-all-that-glitters-is-gold/.
117 The dissent in N. v. U.K. pointed to this same problem in the case law, in stating “the view
expressed by the majority that such a finding “would place too great a burden on the Contracting
States” . . . reflects the real concern that they had in mind: if the applicant were allowed to remain in the
United Kingdom to benefit from the care that her survival requires, then the resources of the State would
be overstretched.” N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 8 (Tulkens, J., dissenting); see also S.J. v. Belgium,
App. No. 70055/10 at ¶ 7 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., dissenting) (similarly alluding to the improper
consideration of the financial burden of the expelling State in holding, “[N] clearly distorts the reasoning
behind Article 3 of the Convention, by watering down the legal force of that provision on the basis of
purely speculative assumptions regarding both the future care and support that seriously ill persons will
receive from the national authorities in the receiving State and the economic burden they represent for
the Contracting Parties to the ECHR. Its reasoning is an argumentum ad consequentiam, which considers
that the disadvantages of a course of action based on a certain legal solution outweigh its advantages.”).
118 ECtHR Article 8 Guide, supra note 82, at ¶¶ 7, 100, 120.
(“When it comes to access to health services, the Court has been cautious to extend Article 8 in a manner
that would implicate extensive State resources because in view of their familiarity with the demands made
on the healthcare system as well as with the funds available to meet those demands, the national
authorities are in a better position to carry out this assessment than an international court.”); See, e.g.,
Pentiacova and Others v. Moldova, App. No. 14462/03, 15 (April 1, 2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-67997.
119 N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 7 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (“we also strongly disagree with
the highly controversial statement made by the majority in paragraph 44 of the judgment in the context
of the non-derogable right of Article 3[ . . . ]”).
120 Id. at ¶ 44.
121 Id. at ¶ 7 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (“the balancing exercise in the context of Article 3 was clearly
rejected by the Court in its recent Saadi v. Italy [ . . . ], confirming the Chahal judgment [ . . . ]”).
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courts’ continued reliance on outdated principles suggests that its overly
stringent application of Article 3 to cases of deportation arises from a general
consideration of improper factors. There can be no derogation to the
protections afforded by Article 3, period.122 If the court does take social and
economic factors into account, it may only do so in its attempt to make the
safeguards of Article 3 both “practical and effective” for the applicant by
considering the social and environmental factors giving rise to the risk of illtreatment, as was seen in B.B. v. France.123 Thus, given this well-established
Article 3 case law, continuing to follow the outdated approach to Article 3
health cases would be contrary to the absolute nature of Article 3.124
Finally, and most importantly, the ECtHR improperly ignored half of
the reasoning provided by the Court in D. v. U.K. For years, the ECtHR’s
application only gave substantial weight to the “very exceptional
circumstances” language provided in the 1997 opinion. However, D. v. U.K.
also stipulated in the very same sentence that the “compelling humanitarian
considerations at stake” assisted the Court in arriving at its conclusion.125
Therefore, the ECtHR in D. v. U.K. was clearly attempting to provide
broader protections than what was afforded to applicants in subsequent
cases.
Following this, it makes sense that national courts subsequently applied
the incorrect Article 3 health standard for many years. However, these courts
separately erred in refusing to apply the appropriately slackened Paposhvili
standard. First and foremost, sticking with N. v. U.K. fails to recognize the
establishment of the ECHR as a “living document.”126 Despite the language

122

ECHR, supra note 1, at art. 15(2).
B.B. v. France, App. No. 47/1998/950/1165, at ¶¶ 37–39.
124 Saccucci, supra note 112, at 17-18 (“One may arguably wonder how an absolute prohibition can
be guaranteed only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ and how the higher evidentiary threshold required in
cases where the source of the risk is not directly attributable to the authorities of the receiving State can
be considered in line with the alleged non-derogability of the protection against removal as conceived by
the Court in Saadi (where it stated that the protection afforded by Article 3 ECHR does not allow for a
higher standard of proof to be required in order to establish the risk of ill-treatment in case of removal)”);
ECHR Article 3 Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at ¶ 4.9 (Recall that the absolute nature of Article 3 has been
seen as an essential “safety net” particularly in cases of deportation.).
125 D. v. U.K., App. No. 30240/96 at ¶ 54. This is especially true considering the structure of the
relevant sentence, in that there is an ‘and’ between the two individual reasonings prior to a comma. This
suggests that the court considered both the “very exceptional circumstances of this case” and “the
compelling humanitarian considerations at stake” to factor into their decision that removing the applicant
would be a violation of Article 3.
126 Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, (July 28, 1999), at ¶ 101(finding “certain acts which
were classified in the past as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ as opposed to ‘torture’ could be
classified differently in the future.”); APT Guide, supra note 12, at 41 (Thus, the Court is not bound to
follow its previous decisions, but is free to re-evaluate case law and extend the scope of Article 3 to acts
which had not previously been regarded as torture or ill-treatment.).
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of their domestic law,127 national courts cannot just allude to a domestic
provision to avoid applying a new standard from the ECtHR. The ECtHR’s
holding in Paposhvili presented the United Kingdom with a relaxed standard
to follow and a more lenient application, which was more aligned with the
intentions of the “humanitarian considerations” of D. v. U.K. in Article 3
health cases.128 The national courts are thus required to abide by this.
Separately, the U.K. national courts reason that N. v. U.K. is the “clear and
constant line” drawn by the ECtHR; however, N. v. U.K. was arguably not
clear at all considering that the ECtHR in Paposhvili, and many scholars
since, explained why the previous Article 3 health case law (i.e. the
“deathbed analysis”) is actually inconsistent with the earliest decisions.129 By
undermining the justifications arising from the early ECtHR Article 3 health
cases, the Court in Paposhvili inserted doubt as to whether the subsequent
case law was clear on this matter,130 and it is thus unlikely that such a stream
of case law could meet the level of clear and constant required by the United
Kingdom national statute. Paposhvili, on the other hand, did outline factors
for national courts to weigh in applying Article 3 to deportation cases of
persons in poor health,131 which better align with the original relaxation of
Article 3 in D. v. U.K. and B.B. v. France. Still, the ECtHR needs to move
beyond Paposhvili’s slight relaxation of the actual language used in the N. v.
U.K. standard to create a standard that better reflects the lenient application
found in Paposhvili.
In further clarifying the Article 3 health standard, the ECtHR should
take the following suggestions into consideration. First, while the case law
popularly suggests that there are only two groupings consisting of (1) torture
and (2) inhuman or degrading treatment, there is in fact reason to believe that
these groupings should be analyzed as three separate items.132 While the
practice of Article 3 indicates we should treat these as two separate
components, the language of the provision itself suggests we treat them as
three separate features, each with their own minimum level of suffering to
127 N. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2003] EWCA Civ 1369 at 8 (“in the absence of some
special circumstances, [it seems to me that the court should] follow any clear and constant jurisprudence
of the [European Court of Human Rights.]”).
128 This has since been affirmed in Savran v. Denmark, as well.
129 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶¶ 181–82; see, e.g., Virginia Mantouvalou, N v
U.K.: No Duty to Rescue the Nearby Needy?, 72 Mod. L. Rev. 815 (2009).
130 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶¶ 181–82.
131 Id. at ¶¶ 189-90.
132 See, e.g., Soering v. U.K., App. No. 14038/88 at ¶ 100 (“Treatment has been held by the Court to
be both “inhuman” because it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and “caused, if not
actual bodily injury, at least intense physical and mental suffering”, and also “degrading” because it was
“such as to arouse in [its] victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and
debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance.”).
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be met. Specifically, the word “or” between “inhuman” and “degrading”
suggests that there are two different standards, whereas the inclusion of ‘and’
there instead would have grouped these two together. This diction was
intentional and indicates there are actually three categories referenced in
ECHR Article 3, with different thresholds. . In recognizing this and
broadening what constitutes torture, “inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment” the Court would not only provide better protection in Article 3
health cases but more adequate protections across the board. It would follow
from this adjustment that any Article 3 health case that doesn’t meet the
necessary requirements for the high threshold of torture would most
definitely meet either a standard of “inhuman” or “degrading” treatment.
Additionally, this degradation moves beyond one’s deathbed. Ultimately,
pairing these two together does the ECHR provision a disservice by raising
the level of suffering necessary to meet both of those prohibited treatments.
Even if one argues that the effect is the same, it definitely would not be in
cases of poor health, as sick people are already in a most vulnerable state.
Not allowing individuals the treatment necessary and forcing them to live a
life deprived of the little dignity they may possess would likely be inhuman
or degrading.
The Court in Paposhvili also added that if there remains “serious
doubts” regarding the impact of removal following the States’ assessment,
then the returning State “must obtain individual and sufficient assurance
from the receiving State that appropriate treatment will be available and
accessible on return.”133 The Court should clarify two points on this portion
of the standard, though: first, it should explain what it means by “individual
and sufficient assurance,” and second, it should declare whether such
assurance constitutes a mere factor or an end to the matter. In regard to the
appropriate assurances, this essay recommends referring to Saadi v. Italy and
Savran v. Denmark.134
B. Other Legal Implications: ECHR Articles 2 and 8
This subsection addresses the application of ECtHR Articles 2 (right to
life) and 8 (right to privacy and family life) to Article 3 health cases, arguing
that the ECtHR needs to explore all claims presented in these cases involving
133

Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 191 (emphasis added).
Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 at ¶ 124–27, 148 (“even if, as they did not do in the present
case, the Tunisian authorities had given the diplomatic assurances requested by Italy, that would not have
absolved the Court from the obligation to examine whether such assurances provided, in their practical
application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant would be protected against the risk of treatment
prohibited by the Convention . . . The weight to be given to assurances from the receiving State depends,
in each case, on the circumstances prevailing at the material time.”); see also Savran v. Denmark, App.
No. 57467/15 at ¶¶ 43–67 (dealing with the sufficient assurance issue from Paposhvili.).
134
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sick individuals facing deportation, as these claims present different and
separate protections.
1. Article 2 and the Right to Life
To begin, the ECtHR’s regular dismissal of Article 2 claims by dealing
with them under the structure of Article 3 is improper, despite the courts’
supposed inability to “dissociate” the two claims from one another.135 The
right to life in Article 2 implicates a number of distinct notions from Article
3, including a stronger connection to Article 15 in its explicit prohibition of
the death penalty across international law.136 Guidelines on the interpretation
of Article 2 state that unless during wartime, a sentence having the effect of
the death penalty would be in violation of Article 15.137 Presented with this
understanding, Article 2 may prove useful in cases where a claimant can
argue that the “serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of
health resulting in intense suffering or . . . a significant reduction in life
expectancy” standard from Paposhvili essentially results in a death sentence
upon deportation.138 Considering any sentence having the effect of the death
penalty violates Article 15 and one’s right to life, accordingly, the dismissal
of Article 2 out of pure convenience is improper.
Similarly, the case law of Article 2 presents a separate basis for not
deporting individuals of Article 3 health cases. For instance, combining the
concepts found from Oyal and McCann, an applicant of an Article 3 health
case can separately argue that the expelling State’s intentional act of
deporting a seriously ill individual, knowing that doing so will risk the life
of the individual, is “beyond that which was absolutely necessary.”139 While
Oyal referred to omissions of the offending State, the ECtHR has found both

135 S.C.C. v. Sweden, App. No. 46553/99 at 6 (“The Government consider that there is nothing to
indicate that the expulsion of the applicant would amount to a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.
In any event, the Government find it difficult to dissociate the complaint raised under Article 2 from the
substance of her complaint under Article 3. They therefore deal with the substance of her complaints
under the latter provision.”); see also Giuliana and Gaggio v. Italy, App. No. 23458/02, ¶ 174 (Mar. 24,
2011), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/0363c3/pdf/ (“Article 2 ranks as one of the most fundamental
provisions in the Convention, one which in peace time, admits of no derogation under Article 15.”).
136 ECHR, supra note 1, art. 15; Protocol 13, supra note 72; ECtHR Article 15 Guide, supra note 72,
at ¶¶ 28-30.
137 ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 2, 72-75.To provide a brief background, Article 15
did away with death penalty sentences outside of wartime and then ECHR Protocol 13 established the
complete abolition of the death penalty. In doing so, it strengthened the absolute nature of Article 2’s
right to life, which, much like Article 3, was founded in Article 15. See ECHR, supra note 1, art. 15(2)
(“No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from
Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.”).
138 Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 183.
139 McCann
v. U.K., App. No. 18984/91, ¶ 148-175 (Sept. 27, 1995),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57943.
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acts and omissions to apply to States’ obligations under Article 2.140 Finally,
Article 2 can at the very least separately support an argument that ECHR
violations involving potential risks, which have not yet materialized, equate
to a finding where the violating harm had indeed surfaced.141 Ultimately, a
separate review of Article 2 may stand as a significant safety net for ECHR
protection in Article 3 health cases, especially considering the recent
broadening of the right to life in the international dimension.142
On the other hand, the distinctions between Article 2 and Article 3 are
not the only reasons why the ECtHR should undergo a full analysis
regardless of its Article 3 finding. Article 3 does not need to be completely
removed from a proper analysis of Article 2, as “[t]ogether with Article 3, it
enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the
Council of Europe.”143 In fact, pairing these two Articles with Article 15
helps uphold the true purpose of their existence, which underlies the
ECtHR’s clear respect for an individual’s dignified life. Therefore, rather
than severely limiting the applicability of Articles 2 and 3, individuals are
deserving of the most available protections from them. In cases of any doubt,
such as the ones presented in the ECtHR’s Article 3 health cases, courts
should err on the side of caution for an individual’s life. With this said, the
ECtHR’s dismissal of Article 2 suggests that such an argument would not
stand in the Court.
2. Article 8 and the Right to Privacy and Family Life
While the ECtHR most often considers Article 8 in connection with
Article 3 health cases, it almost always comes to the same conclusion it finds
in the Article 3 analysis and presents little substantive analysis on the matter.
This suggests that the ECtHR is currently misrepresenting the unique
contributions that an Article 8 claim can play in these cases.144 From the plain
language of the protections of Article 8 alone, it appears incredibly relevant
in Article 3 health cases, as they involve impediments on an individual’s
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ECtHR Article 2 Guide, supra note 69, at ¶ 36.
R.R. and Others v. Hungary, App. No. 19400/11 at ¶¶ 28-29 .
142 U.N.H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018); Lucy
McKernan and Bret Thiele, UN Human Rights Committee Brings New Vitality to the Right to Life,
OpenGlobalRights (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.openglobalrights.org/un-human-rights-committeebrings-new-vitality-to-the-right-to-life/ (ensuring the protection of a right to enjoy a life with dignity).
143 Giuliana and Gaggio v. Italy, App. No. 23458/02 at ¶ 174.
144 See, e.g., N. v. U.K., App. No. 26565/05 at ¶ 26 (Tulkens, J., dissenting) (“While it is
understandable that the Court, in its case-law, has refrained from examining a second complaint –
concerning the same facts – when the first has given rise to a finding of a violation, it is certainly strange
for the Court to be using the laconic form of words ‘it is not necessary to examine the complaint under
Article 8 of the Convention’ after finding that there was no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.”).
141

117

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

“right to physical and psychological integrity” and often affect one’s right to
personal development and the development of certain relationships falling
within the protected “sphere.”145 That said, Article 8’s strongest distinction
from Article 3 is the significant role it can play in the protections of one’s
quality of life, especially considering other articles are specifically
unconcerned with this.146
While Pretty v. United Kingdom – the case announcing Article 8’s
devotion to the quality of life – was about medical futility, it is similar in
nature to many of the Article 3 health cases whose applicants are also
“suffering from the devastating effects of a degenerative disease which will
cause [his or] her condition to deteriorate further and increase [his or] her
physical and mental suffering.”147 Recognizing this, it would follow that
Article 8 could serve as a valuable tool to argue that the ECtHR’s reasoning
in Pretty similarly applies in Article 3 health cases, in that “the way [the
applicant] chooses to pass the closing moments of [his or] her life is part of
the act of living, and [thus, applicants have] a right to ask that this be
respected.”148 Ultimately, Article 8 warrants a separate, in-depth review,
regardless of any prior finding on Article 3.
C. Article 5 and the ACHR
The final conclusion drawn from the research above relates to this
article’s attempt to propose a more appropriate standard for the ECtHR’s
application to Article 3 health cases. As such, this section recommends that
the ECtHR shift closer toward the ACHR approach to the corresponding
Article 5 health cases. In doing so, the ECtHR will merely further its initial
stride toward the ACHR standards by reintroducing a purposive element into
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Id.
Pretty v. U.K., App. No. 2346/02 at ¶ 65 (“The very essence of the Convention is respect for
human dignity and human freedom. Without in any way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected
under the Convention, the Court considers that it is under Article 8 that notions of the quality of life take
on significance.”); Pretty v. U.K., App. No. 2346/02 at ¶ 39. (“Article 2 of the Convention is phrased in
different terms. It is unconcerned with issues to do with the quality of living or what a person chooses to
do with his or her life.”); see also H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct.
30, 2018);McKernan & Thiele, supra note 138.
147 Pretty v. U.K., App. No. 2346/02 at ¶ 64.
148 Id. at ¶ 64. While this case used the medical technology argument to develop a case against
remaining alive, it can be argued in the reverse to show that people should be allowed the chance to utilize
this medical technology for the advancement of their physical or mental state. However, this argument is
admittedly rather weak. Id. at ¶ 65 (the court also provided, “In an era of growing medical sophistication
combined with longer life expectancies, many people are concerned that they should not be forced to
linger on in old age or in states of advanced physical or mental decrepitude which conflict with strongly
held ideas of self and personal identity.”).
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a finding of torture through practice.149 Applied in the context of Article 3
health cases specifically, this essay recommends making the distinction
between treatment and punishment, as was seen in Andrea. Doing so would
likely allow the comparable case law in the ECtHR to more accurately apply
the court’s recognition of an applicant’s criminal convictions. While
increasing the protections available to ECHR Article 3 applicants, it provides
more specificity for the Paposhvili guidelines. Furthermore, the courts’
finding that the deportation “may well be fatal” supports the arguments
presented in Article 2 and Article 8’s application regarding the death
sentence.150 Finally, doing so will better align with the European policies on
the right to health.151
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are many potential areas to expand upon from this article since
this topic is relatively unexplored in the legal arena today. To start, in future
research, it is recommended that scholars further expand the comparative
analysis in this essay to include the case law of the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights. Doing this will allow for a better understanding of the
impact that an explicitly recognized right to health can have on a society, as
Africa also recognizes a right to health in Article 16 of its actual convention.
Second, following the ECtHR’s hopeful adjustment in fully analyzing all
claims presented in Article 3 health cases, scholars can begin to analyze the
true effect that Articles 2 and 8 have on these cases. It would also be helpful
to explore the potential role of Article 14152 regarding non-discrimination in
such cases since health has been deemed a “status” subject to
nondiscrimination protections153 and these cases often involve HIV positive
individuals, whom have been declared a vulnerable group in society.154
149 See Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94 at ¶¶ 97–98; see also Aktaş v. Turkey, App. No.
24351/94 at ¶ 313; APT Guide, supra note 12, at 16.
150 For instance, they may prove useful in cases where a claimant can argue that the “serious, rapid
and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant
reduction in life expectancy” standard from Paposhvili essentially results in a death sentence upon
deportation. Paposhvili v. Belgium, App. No. 41738/10 at ¶ 183.
151 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 35, 2007 O.J. C 303/01 [hereinafter
Charter of Rights] (stating “Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to
benefit from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high
level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union
policies and activities).
152 ECHR, supra note 1, art. 14.
153 V.A.M. v. Serbia, App No. 39177/05, ¶ 114 (Mar. 13, 2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00179769.
154 Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, ¶ 64 (Mar. 10, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001103904 (finding a violation of Articles 14 and 8 when an applicant was refused residency due to his HIV
diagnosis, taking into account the applicant’s membership of a “particularly vulnerable group”); I.B. v.
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Eventually, this will adjust the analysis from the other legal implications
section above to include Article 14 alongside Articles 2 and 8. This is a
favorable development, considering “[h]ealth-related cases brought before
the [ECtHR] have most frequently been argued under Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14
of the Convention.”155
Finally, it would be helpful to broadly explore the ECtHR’s role in
supporting the progression of the European right to health through its case
law.156 In doing so, legal scholars should more closely explore the different
health distinctions created in the Article 3 health cases. For one, an
examination of the role that mental health plays in ECtHR decisions and how
the court’s treatment of mental health has changed over the years, might help
expose the type of illnesses and treatments the ECtHR is looking to protect
over others. Given that nearly forty percent of all Europeans today suffer
from mental health illnesses, Europe’s cultural perspectives on and social
commitments to mental healthcare have drastically changed.157 Even the
European Commission has recognized this clear shift to focusing on mental
health by requesting that “mental health . . . be considered as a public health
priority due to the heavy burden it places on the EU and its Member
States”.158 Following this declaration, major policies were implemented for
the recognition and improvement of mental health issues.159 Determining
what roles this might play in ECtHR case law could further the analysis of
this essay. Additionally, there might be a stronger argument available after a

Greece, App. No. 552/10, ¶ 80 (Mar. 10, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-127055 (recognizing
that “people with HIV have to face a whole host of problems, not only medical but also professional,
social, personal and psychological, and to confront deeply rooted prejudice even from among highly
educated people [ . . . ]. The prejudice was born out of ignorance about the routes of transmission of
HIV/Aids, and has stigmatised and marginalised those who live with the virus. Consequently, the Court
has held that people living with HIV are a vulnerable group and that the State should be afforded only a
narrow margin of appreciation in choosing measures that single out this group for differential treatment
on account of their health status.”).
155 Thematic Report, supra note 66, at 5.
156 See generally ANNIEK DE RUIJTER, EU HEALTH LAW & POLICY : THE EXPANSION OF
EU POWER IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE (2019); Charter of Rights, supra note 147, at
art. 35, (stating “Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit from
medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human
health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and
activities).
157 Kate Kelland, Nearly 40 percent of Europeans suffer mental illness, Reuters (September 4, 2011),
available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-mental-illness/nearly-40-percent-of-europeanssuffer-mental-illness-idUSTRE7832JJ20110904.
158 European Commission, The State of Mental Health in the European Union (2004), available at
https://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_projects/2001/monitoring/fp_monitoring_2001_frep_06_en.pdf.
159 European Commission, Policies and practices for mental health in Europe (2008), available at
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/280604/WHO-Europe-Mental-Health-Acion-Plan2013-2020.pdf.
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more in-depth study of the different types of physical illnesses (e.g. chronic
versus fatal illnesses of AIDS, cancer, kidney disease, etc.) and their various
treatments (e.g. minimally versus highly invasive procedures, medicine
versus machinery). Providing actual data on how the court has ruled in these
cases and what they have specifically said about the illnesses and treatments
at hand might support a more specific and clear approach to Article 3 health
cases which differentiates according to the disease at issue.
CONCLUSION
In the end, Paposhvili shows that the ECtHR once again appears to be
loosening its standard for Article 3 health cases in attempting to provide
greater protections to those threatened with deportation to a State where he
or she would receive inadequate health care.160 This article shows the need
for the court to adjust this standard in a consistent and lenient manner. Given
its historical application of Article 3 as an absolute right, the additional
protections provided by Articles 2 and 8 in these cases, and the comparably
greater protection provided by the IACtHR under the ACHR, the ECtHR and
the national courts bound by its decisions should be encouraged to actually
provide the absolute protection to its citizens from torture, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment that Article 3 alludes to. Nevertheless,
the aforementioned courts, through their precedent, have instead effectively
narrowed the initially protective standard created in D.v. U.K. – and now
clarified in Paposhvili – so extensively that the limitations on the protective
standard have begun to swallow the overall intentions of the rule, which was
meant to protect sick and vulnerable individuals under “very exceptional
circumstances” with “compelling humanitarian considerations at stake” from
inhuman treatment.161
This essay concludes that (i) the ECtHR has incorrectly applied Article
3 to cases of poor health and deportation in the past, (ii) the ECtHR still
needs to further clarify an appropriate standard for these cases, (iii) the
national courts, particularly in the United Kingdom, are incorrectly
following old precedent, (iv) the ECtHR needs to explore all claims
presented to it in Article 3 health cases, especially claims of Article 2 and 8
violations, and (v) the ECtHR should shift more toward the American
Convention on Human Rights approach to Article 3 health cases in better
aligning with the European policies on the right to health. Ultimately, in
addressing these concerns, the referenced courts might finally fill the vast
protection gap that exists in Article 3 health cases today.
160

With the first time this occurred being the D. v. U.K. case in 1997.
D. v. U.K., App. No. 30240/96 at ¶ 54. Consider, for instance, the fact that the ECtHR has only
provided protection in two cases over the course of twenty years.
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